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An Anatomy of the Magnet Effect: 
Evidence from the Korea Stock Exchange High-Frequency Data 
 
Abstract 
We examine the existence and the forms of the magnet effect using transaction files and 
limit order book of the Korea Stock Exchange. A significant magnet effect exists in all five market 
microstructure variables (the rate of return, trading volume, volatility, order flow, and order type) 
when the limit hit becomes imminent. Specifically, investors place increasingly more orders, 
choose proportionally more market orders, and frequently reposition existing orders to advance 
transactions. We also find that: (i) a narrower price limit exhibits higher acceleration rates in all five 
variables compared to a wider price limit; and (ii) the upper limit hits draw heavier volumes of 
transactions, order submissions and market orders than the lower limit hits. We confirm that the 
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Starting from its initiation, a price limit is imposed as a means to curb excessive price 
movement and prices being carried too far away. Recently price limits have been implemented in a 
majority of the Asian and European stock markets. The implications of price limits on market 
liquidity, volatility and price discovery processes have drawn a great deal of attention from market 
participants, regulators and scholars.
1 
In practice, most stock exchanges have undergone repeated changes in price limit rules. For 
example, the Taiwan Stock Exchange used eleven different daily price limits since 1962 with its 
most recent change from 5% to 7% in 1989; the Stock Exchange of Thailand raised the price limit 
from 10% to 30% at the end of 1997; the Korea Stock Exchange (KRX) raised it from 4.6% to 15% 
in four phases from 1995 to 1999 and its most recent change from 12% to 15% was implemented 
on December 7, 1998.  
Most of past studies on price limits are limited to the analysis of daily price movements and 
the primary focus is on the post-limit-hit period, which leaves one important aspect of price limits 
largely unexplored, i.e., the magnet effect or the gravitational effect. Therefore, the discussions of 
the magnet effect in earlier studies are mostly conjectural. Miller (1991) states that circuit breakers 
could be self-fulfilling if traders rush to avoid being locked into their positions when prices come in 
the range of the trigger point. Greenwald and Stein (1991) note that the magnet effect makes circuit 
breakers vulnerable to criticism in that the very existence of a circuit breaker might somehow cause 
large declines to feed on themselves and cause the market to crash.
2 Gerety and Mulherin (1992) 
also point out that the possibility of a trading halt after a price change of a given percent would 
make investors generally nervous and prone to leave the market more quickly compared to a 
situation where a circuit breaker did not exist.  
                                                 
1 The early studies on price limits date back to the 1970s.  See, for example, Hieronymus (1971). 
 
2 The theories on circuit breakers can be applicable to the price limits because of the similarities in their 
functionality. Both of them curb continuous trading in the entire market and/or for individual stocks. 
However, circuit breakers close the market completely but price limits allow transactions to continue at the 
limit prices. In practice, volume quickly dries up when a price limit is triggered. Therefore, price limits 
function essentially the same way as circuit breakers. 
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Subrahmanyam (1994) offers the most direct predictions of the magnet effect with his inter-
temporal model of circuit breakers. He proposes that price variability, market liquidity, trading 
volume, and the probability of the price crossing circuit breaker bounds will increase in the period 
before the limit hit due to suboptimal order submissions. The implications of price limits may also 
be relevant to the literature on market closure because the trigger of price limit interrupts 
continuous trading. Slezak (1994), for example, uses a multi-period model on market closure and 
predicts that market closures increase pre-closure trading volume because closures will delay the 
resolution of information uncertainty and impose more risk on both informed and uninformed 
traders. This idea is also reflected in Subrahmanyam (1995), in which he notes that discretionary 
closures can bring more information into the closure decision and therefore they can be less 
susceptible to the magnet effect than rule-based halts.  
Theoretical studies on circuit breakers and price limits support the existence of the magnet 
effect but existing empirical evidence is mixed. Studies on derivatives markets tend to report the 
non-existence of the magnet effect.  For example, Kuserk et al. (1989) examine the price behavior 
on limit hit days for Treasury bond and commodity futures contracts but they do not find evidence 
in support of the magnet effect. In another study, Arak and Cook (1997) examine price behavior in 
the U.S. Treasury bond futures market in the mornings after large overnight price movements. They 
conclude that a price reversal after the market open signals calming effects instead of the magnet 
effect. Berkman and Steenbeek (1998) investigate price, relative trading volume and volatility prior 
to the limit hits using Nikkei 225 futures contracts traded in the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) 
and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX).
3  They attribute the lack of the 
magnet effect to strong arbitrage links between the OSE and the SIMEX. Finally, Hall and Korfman 
(2001) examine five agricultural futures contracts and find that daily price limit in the futures 
markets has neither any impact on traders’ expectations nor some stabilization effect, thus rejecting 
the gravitational effect. 
                                                 
3 The SIMEX is now a part of the Singapore Exchange. 
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Studies on stock markets, however, provide supportive evidence of the magnet effect.   
McMillan (1990) examines market breaks in the United States on October 13
th and 16
th of 1987 and 
finds strong patterns of runs in prices prior to the triggering of the circuit breakers. Ackert et al. 
(2001) find that market participants accelerate their transactions if a trading interruption is 
imminent under an experimental setting. Cho et al. (2003), using high-frequency data from the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange, document a distinct tendency for stock prices to accelerate toward the 
upper bound and weak evidence of acceleration toward the lower bound. Chan et al. (2005), using 
transaction data from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, find that price limits themselves cause 
order imbalances prior to the limit hits, which is indication of the magnet effect as illustrated in the 
latter part of this paper.  
In general, studies on the magnet effect are far from conclusive or comprehensive, 
especially for the equity markets. Three weaknesses are noted in earlier studies. First, results drawn 
from the futures markets may not be generalized to the stock markets. Ma et al. (1989) suggest that 
we need to be cautious when ascribing their results to the equity markets due to the institutional 
differences between the futures and the equity markets. Second, the existence of the magnet effect 
can be captured when transaction data and the limit order book rather than daily data are used. 
Earlier studies have not taken advantage of the tick-by-tick data largely due to the unavailability of 
such data. Third, earlier studies on the magnet effect focus primarily on the rate of return, leaving 
out other important market microstructure variables such as trading volume, order flow, quote 
positions, order types, etc. Cho et al. (2003) provide the most rigorous modeling on the magnet 
effect so far but their focus is solely on the return series.  We believe that the return variable alone 
can not unfold the dynamic process of the magnet effect. For example, if the rising rate of return is 
not associated with elevated trading volume, the magnet effect should be considered very minimal 
because only a small number of transactions would respond to the price limit. If investors 
proactively react to the proximity of the price limit, we would observe that investors use their 
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discretions to improve order positions in order to advance transactions; this has not been 
documented in earlier studies.
4  
The main objective of our paper is to delineate the intraday dynamic process of the magnet 
effect. Our contributions to the current literature are four-fold. First, we apply a multi-variable 
approach to investigate the magnet effect. Five market microstructure variables, namely, rates of 
return, trading volume, volatility, order flow, and order type are considered in this study.  Second, 
we introduce a quadratic function to capture the nature of the magnet effect.  Earlier studies are 
quite vague about the forms of the magnet effect; w rather than daily data ords such as self-
fulfilling, gravitation, and acceleration are used to define the magnet effect. In our paper, we model 
the magnet effect by applying a quadratic function to the five market microstructure variables. A 
convex function is perceived as a strong support of the magnet effect. Third, we address the magnet 
effect from three dimensions: magnitude, acceleration and persistence.  The slope of the convex 
function measures the acceleration rate while the persistence of the magnet effect is defined as the 
time-interval between the lowest point of the convex curve to the limit hit.  The respective sizes of 
the five standardized market microstructure variables at ten three-minute intervals indicate the 
magnitude of the magnet effect. Fourth, we compare the magnet effect between two price limit 
regimes and between the upper and the lower limit hits from all these three dimensions. To the best 
of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to examine the magnet effect in a multi-variable and multi-
dimensional setting.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the institutional 
background as well as of the relevant summary statistics of the KRX. Section II presents the 
research methodology. Section III reports the empirical results. We present strong evidence in 
support of the magnet effect from all five variables. Moreover, a narrower price limit exhibits 
higher acceleration rates compared to the wider price limit; the upper limit hits draw heavier trading 
volume, order flow, and market orders compared to the lower limits hits. Section IV presents 
                                                 
4 One exception is Chan et al. (2005). 
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robustness analysis. We observe that there is no magnet effect for the firm and for the time-of-the-
day matched non-limit-hit groups. It is also documented that the magnet effect is robust to 
momentum effect.  We find that there is no magnet effect in the NASDAQ, which is a market 
without the price limit rule. This finding confirms that the magnet effect is caused by the cap/floor 
imposed by the price limit rule. Section V concludes the paper.  
I.  Institutional Background and Summary Statistics 
A. Institutional  Background 
The KRX is one of the most active stock exchanges in the world. In the year of 2004, its 
annual share turnover ratio is 397% compared with 99% on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); 
its average market capitalization is $375 billion and the average daily trading volume is 305 million 
shares. At the end of 2004, the KRX had 683 listed companies and 844 listed issues.   
The market opens from Monday to Friday and the KRX currently has four trading sessions 
in each trading day: a pre-hours session 7:30-8:30 A.M., a morning session 9:00 A.M.-12:00 Noon, 
an afternoon session 1:00-3:00 P.M., and an after-hours session 3:10-4:00 P.M.
5  As in the case of 
many Asian stock markets, the KRX is an order-driven market, where buy and sell orders compete 
for the best prices. A call market auction is applied to the morning and afternoon session’s open and 
the market close. Orders are accumulated between 2:50 P.M. and 3:00 P.M and a single auction 
occurs at 3:00 P.M to determine the closing price. During other time periods of the regular sessions, 
orders are continuously matched to satisfy both parties in terms of price and time priority. The pre-
hours and after-hours sessions are specially designed to facilitate basket trading where paired buy 
and sell orders are executed at the preceding closing prices.  
The KRX fully automated its securities trading on September 1, 1997. It runs an order 
routing system and the KRX Automated Trading System (KATS). The order routing system 
receives order inputs through system terminals at member firms’ offices and then transmits them to 
                                                 
5 The pre-hours session was introduced on December 1, 2003. The after-hours session was extended by 20 
minutes on October 14, 2002. It was from 3:10-3:40PM in our sample period. 
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the KATS. The KATS executes orders, transmits information on the transaction to the order routing 
system and produces the information necessary for clearing and settlement.  
The KRX currently sets the daily price limit at 15%; stock prices can not move beyond 
15% above or below the previous day’s closing price. The KRX believes that the price limit system 
can moderate excessive price fluctuations and maintains an orderly market. The last change on the 
price limit was introduced on December 7, 1998 when the price limit was raised from 12% to 15%. 
We use this event date to divide our study period into two regimes; the pre-regime between 
September 1, 1998 and December 6, 1998 and the post-regime between December 8, 1998 and 
March 31, 1999. On the same day, the KRX eliminated Saturday trading and extended its morning 
session by one hour, from 9:30-11:30 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.-12:00 Noon.  
B. Summary  Statistics 
We use real-time transaction data and the limit order book of the KRX during the study 
period from September 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999, with 80 trading days in the pre-regime period 
and 73 trading days in the post-regime period. We select the stocks that had average daily 
transactions above 100 and traded on each of the 153 trading days in our study period to avoid thin-
trading problems.
6 In total, our sample contains 385 stocks, totaling $52.7 billion in capitalization 
and the average firm size is $137 million as of September 1, 1998. Our sample stocks are from 39 
out of the 41 industries in the KRX; they consist of 220 small firms, 77 medium firms and 88 large 
firms based on the rule set by the KRX.
7  
The daily price limit literally sets the boundaries of allowable prices, +12% in the pre- 
regime and + 15% in the post-regime from the previous day’s closing price. However, prices do not 
                                                 
6 More stringent sampling criteria are used and the statistical results remain qualitatively similar. 
 
7 Based on the fact book published by the KRX, companies are defined as small firms with capitalization less 
than 35 billion won, medium firms with capitalization between 35 billion won and 75 billion won, and large 
firms with capitalization above 75 billion won. At the current exchange rate, $1 is equivalent to about 1,000 
won.  
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need to reach the actual limit price to effectively trigger the limit due to the existence of tick sizes.
8 
For example, if stock k closes at 4,900 won on day t and the ruling price limit is 15%, day t+1’s 
allowable price range is between 4,165 won and 5,635 won. When the stock price reaches 5,630 
won, it can not move up further because the minimum price movement is 10 won. As a result, at the 
price of 5,630 won, stock k effectively triggers the price limit. In our paper, we use this effective 
price in identifying limit hits. 
An upper limit hit is identified when Hk,t > (1+LIMIT)Ck,t-1 - TICKk,t, where Hk,t is the stock 
k’s high price on day t, Ck,t-1 is the stock k’s closing price on day t-1, LIMIT is the prevailing 
percentage price limit, and TICKk,t is the tick size for the stock k at price Hk,t. A lower limit hit is 
identified when Lk,t < (1-LIMIT)Ck,t-1 + TICKk,t, where Lk,t is the low price on day t. Based on the 
direction and the limit regime, we classify our sample of limit hits into four groups: (i) the pre-up; 
(ii) the pre-down; (iii) the post-up; and (iv) the post-down groups with the prefix signifying the 
regime and the suffix representing the direction of price movement.
9  
The summary statistics of limit hits are presented in Table I. Panel A presents limit hits in 
various categories. We identify 1,449 upper limit hits and 300 lower limit hits in the pre-regime, 
1,219 upper limit hits and 492 lower limit hits in the post-regime. The fact that there are 
considerably more upper limit hits than lower limit hits is consistent with the market’s upward trend. 
The KOSPI doubled in our study period and it moved up 66% in the pre-regime and another 20% in 
the post-regime.
10  There are on average 18.1 upper limit hits and 3.8 lower limit hits per trading 
day in the pre-regime, and 16.5 upper limit hits and 6.6 lower limit hits per trading day in the post-
                                                 
8 The tick size rule in the KRX is as follows: it is 5 won if the stock price is lower than 5,000 won; 10 won if 
the price is within (5,000, 10,000); 50 won if the price is within (10,000, 50,000); 100 won if the price is 
within (50,000, 100,000); 500 won if the price is within (100,000, 500,000) and 1,000 won if the price is 
above 500,000 won. 
 
9 We exclude the days that both upper and lower limit hits occurred and the days that prices moved outside 
the price boundaries.
 The KRX may apply a different daily price limit, more likely a wider price limit under 
the following two cases: (i) the market reopens after long holidays; and (ii) the exchange deems that the 
application of the daily price limit is extremely difficult due to drastic changes in market conditions. 
 
10 KOSPI is the Korea composite stock price index. It is a market value weighted index composed of all 
common and preferred stocks listed on the KRX, except bond-type preferred stocks and newly listed stocks. 
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regime. Item (3) reports that about 60% of the upper limit hits and 48% of the lower limit hits take 
place in the morning session. We also observe that there is a spike of limit hits at the market open, 
which is 17% for the pre-up group, 12% for the post-up group, 14% for the pre-down group and 
18% for the post-down group. A high concentration of limit hits at the market open supports the 
belief that market open exhibits higher volatility and heavier transactions than other time of the day 
as a result of the overnight non-trading. Figure 1 exhibits the intraday distribution of limit hits.
11  
[Insert Table I and Figure 1] 
Item (6) of Table I reports the locked limit hits when prices close at the limit prices. We 
find that that 66% of the upper limit hits and 50% of the lower limit hits are locked. Items (7) and 
(8) present the percentage of price continuations and reversals out of the locked limit hit days. If a 
stock closes at the upper/lower limit and opens at an even higher/lower price on the next non-limit-
hit day, it is defined as a price continuation. Similarly, if a stock closes at the upper/lower limit and 
opens at a lower/higher price on the next non-limit-hit day, it is defined as a reversal. We observe 
that a high proportion of locked limit hits are followed by price continuation, 78% for the upper 
limit hits and 62% for the lower limit hits. A high likelihood of price continuation supports the 
delayed price discovery hypothesis documented in Kim and Rhee (1997) and Kim and Sweeney 
(2002). If the price discovery process is interrupted before prices reach the equilibrium, it will 
resume this process when the market reopens, thus continuing the earlier price trend.  
There is also evidence that lower limit hits are less likely to close at the limit prices and less 
likely to be followed by price continuations than upper limit hits. The asymmetry between the 
upper and the lower limit hits is in line with investors’ optimistic sentiment and tendency of 
overreacting to good news. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Butler and Lang (1991) provide 
evidence that analysts provide systematically overly optimistic forecasts on security prices and 
                                                 
11 We use a Chi-squared goodness-of-fit test to compare the likelihood of limit hits during each half hour 
interval. We find that upper limit hits are most likely to occur during the first half hour in the morning session 
and lower hits are most likely to occur during both the first and the last half hour of the trading day.  
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earnings. Therefore, it is plausible that investors chase upward trends more persistently and strongly 
than declining trends. 
Panel B of Table I provides the statistics on the frequency of intraday limit hits, limit hit 
duration and the counts of limit hits by individual stocks. Most stocks trigger price limits repeatedly 
within a limit hit day: prices hit the limit price, drift away and hit the limit again. In our paper, we 
count the first time that prices hit the limit as an observation of a limit hit. The limit hit duration is 
measured from the moment of the first limit hit to the last moment that prices stay at the limit price 
in the same day. The average limit hit duration varies from 50 minutes for the pre-down group to 93 
minutes for the post-down group, higher than the values reported in Cho et al. (2003). The 
maximum number of limit hits by an individual stock varies from 7 for the pre-down group to 21 
for the pre-up group.  
II.    Empirical Design 
We choose the half hour pre-hit period as our study window, drawn backward from the 
moment of the limit hit because the magnet effect is most likely to take effect when the prices reach 
a certain percentage of the allowable price movements and the limit hit becomes imminent. This 
approach avoids setting an arbitrary price threshold for the magnet effect which may vary among 
stocks. We believe that a half hour is long enough to capture the dynamics of the magnet effect and 
short enough to remain focused. Chordia et al. (2005) suggest that the adjustment to the weak form 
market efficiency is not instantaneous and by thirty minutes, it is well under way. Early studies also 
suggest that concentrated trading took place within thirty minutes or less prior to the limit hits. 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) find that investors change their trading behavior during the nine 
minutes before the market breakdown on October 27-28, 1997.  
Next, we assess the magnet effect from the following five market microstructure variables, 
namely, the rate of return, trading volume, volatility, order flow and order type and from the three 
dimensions, namely, magnitude, acceleration rate and persistence during the study period. Each 
variable is measured during the ten three minute intervals of the pre-hit period, denoted by interval 
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1-interval 10 from the furthest to the closest distance to the moment of the limit hit. All the raw 
values are standardized by the same stock’s mean and standard deviation on non-limit hit days in 
each regime. The purpose of standardization is to minimize intraday trading patterns, such as the U-
shaped volatility and volume pattern.
12 If investors react to the proximity of the price limits by 
jumping onto the bandwagon, there is likely to be herding prior to the limit hits. The magnet effect 
is in fact a form of herding where the common signal present in a herding behavior is the proximity 
to the price limit.  
As a result of the magnet effect, we expect to observe a period of concentrated and 
accelerated transactions prior to the limit hits. The magnitude of the magnet effect is reflected in the 
standardized market variables during the pre-hit period. We measure the market variables during 
each interval and across all intervals during the pre-hit period and make comparisons between 
groups. The acceleration rate and the persistence of the magnet effect are defined by the quadratic 
function in which the base model is as follows: 
i t k i t k i t k i t k SQINT INT able MarketVari , , , , , , , , ε γ β α + + + =    (1) 
where the dependent variables are the five standardized market microstructure variables measured 
for stock k on day t at interval i. INT takes the value of 1 to 10 from the furthest to the closest 
distance to the limit hit moment, and SQINT is the squared INT. The variable we are most 
interested in is the SQINT. The coefficient of SQINT, γ measures the acceleration rate of the 
magnet effect. A positive and significant γ implies that the market variables not only increase but 
also increase at a rising speed, supporting the magnet effect. Besides the acceleration rate, the 
quadratic function pinpoints the starting point of an upward trend, i.e. the lowest point of a convex 
curve. We define the persistence of the magnet effect as the time period from this moment onward 
to the moment of the limit hits, stated in the number of minutes.  
                                                 
12 Refer to Wood et al. (1985), Jain and Joh (1988), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Chang et al. (1993). 
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We also introduce dummy variables to the base model in order to compare the same 
direction limit hits between the two regimes, i.e. pre-up vs. post-up, pre-down vs. post-down and 
the directional limit hits within the same regime, i.e. pre-up vs. pre-down and post-up vs. post-down: 
i t k
j




j j i t k SQINT INT Dummy able MarketVari , ,
2
1





, , ε γ β α + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
   (2) 
where independent variables INT and SQINT are defined the same as before. When we make cross-
regime comparisons, Dummy1 takes the value of unity if the observation is from the pre-regime and 
0 otherwise and Dummy2 takes the value of unity if the observation is from the post-regime and 0 
otherwise. When we make in-regime comparisons, Dummy1 and Dummy2 will represent the upper 
limit hits and the lower limit hits respectively.
13  
III.    Empirical Evidence 
A.  Rates of Return  
In this section, we examine the progression of rates of return prior to the limit hits. Because 
the price limit rule is benchmarked to the previous day’s closing price, we introduce a variable, the 
distance to the limit, DTL to proxy the rate of return. At any given price, DTL is the percentage 
distance to the price limit, and ∆DTL (the change of DTL) during a time period fathoms the speed 
of approaching the price limit.
14 Evidently ∆DTL and the rate of return in the same time period are 
highly correlated, with a correlation of 0.9 in our sample. The computations are as follows.
15 
                                                 
13 Equation (2) is equivalent to two individual equations (1) by using regime dummy variables. For example, 
equation (2) for upper limit hits, where Dummy1 takes the value of unity if it is from the pre-up group and 
Dummy2 takes the value of unity if it is from the post-up group, is equivalent to two individual equations (1) 
on the pre-up and post-up groups. 
 
14  Assuming the prevailing price limit is 15%, on the upper limit hit days, DTLk,t,i = 1.15-Pk,t,i/CPk,t-1; 
∆DTLk,t,i = (1.15-Pk,t,i-1/ CPk,t-1)-(1.15-Pk,t,i/ CPk,t-1) = (Pk,t,i- Pk,t,i-1)/ CPk,t-1. On lower limit hit days, DTL k,t,i = P 
k,t,i/CPk,t-1-0.85; ∆DTL k,t,i = (Pk,t,i-1/ CPk,t-1-0.85)-(Pk,t,i/CPk,t-1-0.85) = (Pk,t,i-1-Pk,t,i)/ CPk,t-1. The same formulae 
hold for the other price limit regime because the range of price limit is cancelled out. 
 
15 Our standardization is similar to the methodology used in Lee et al. (1994), Corwin and Lipson (2000), and 
Christie et al. (2002), where they use the difference between the raw value and the mean value on non-halt 
days, stated as a percentage of the mean values of non-halt days. We also used the standardization of ∆DTL 
without demeaning as in Cho et al. (2003). Our results remain qualitatively the same using the above 
methodologies.  
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Upper Limit Hits:    
1 , 1 , , , , , , / ) ( − − − = ∆ t k i t k i t k i t k CP P P DTL
Lower Limit Hits:      
1 , , , 1 , , , , / ) ( − − − = ∆ t k i t k i t k i t k CP P P DTL
 
i k i k i t t i t k SD DTL M DTL DTL ST , , , , , , / ) ( ∆ − ∆ = ∆  
i i t t i N DTL ST DTL MST / , , ∑ ∆ = ∆  
where Pk,t,i  is the last transaction price of stock k at interval i on day t; CPk,t-1 is the closing price for 
stock k on day t-1; ST∆DTLk,t,i is the standardized ∆DTL for stock k on day t at interval i after the 
adjustment of the mean M∆DTLk,i, and the standard deviation, SDk,I where M∆DTL and SD are 
computed using non-limit hit day observations; Ni is the number of observations at interval i within 
each group. MST∆DTLi is the mean standardized ∆DTL at interval i averaged across all the limit 
hits in each group. Earlier studies by Gerety and Mulherin (1992), Subrahmanyam (1994) and Cho 
et al. (2003) have predicted that investors will rush onto the bandwagon when they observe that 
price limit is approached.  
Table II summarizes the progression of ∆DTL during the half hour pre-hit period. Panel A 
reports the magnitude of the average ∆DTL in each interval and across all intervals for the four 
groups. We observe that all the values are significantly positive, indicating that prices move faster 
on limit hit days than on non-limit-hit days during the pre-hit period. ∆DTL tapers off as we move 
away from the limit hit moment, and the interval immediately before the limit hit, interval 10 
features the largest price movement for all groups. At the interval 10 of the pre-down group, ∆DTL 
takes the value of 4.03, followed by 3.3 of the post-down group, 3.2 of the pre-up group and 2.51 of 
the post-up group. The average three minute return is not significantly different from each other for 
the four limit-hit groups. 
[Insert Table II] 
In Panel B, we report the regression results of equation (2), where Dummy1 takes the value 
of unity if it is from the pre-regime and 0 otherwise and Dummy2 takes the value of unity if it is 
from the post-regime and 0 otherwise. We observe that the coefficients of SQINT are significantly 
positive for all four groups, supporting that prices approach the limit at an accelerating speed. The 
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pre-down group has the highest acceleration rate of 0.087, followed by 0.062 of the pre-up group, 
0.055 of the post-down group and 0.038 of the post-up group.
16 We also conclude that the pre-
regime has a significantly higher acceleration rate than the post-regime and the lower limit hits have 
a higher acceleration rate than the upper limit hits in the same regime.  
As described earlier, the quadratic function defines the turning point of a convex curve. The 
computation of the persistence is: (10+β/2γ)*3, where β and γ are the coefficients of INT, SQINT 
respectively. Following this computation, we infer that the persistence is 19.38 minutes, 20.92 
minutes, 17.86 minutes, and 19.77 minutes for the pre-up, the post-up, the pre-down and the post-
down groups, respectively. The average persistence is about 19.5 minutes; the pre-up group exhibits 
a longer persistence than the pre-down group and the difference between the post-up and the post-
down groups are insignificant. 
In summary, we conclude that the rates of return are significantly higher than non-limit-hit 
days and prices accelerate to both the upper and the lower limit hits in two regimes. Our results 
strongly support the existence of the magnet effect. In addition, we observe that the pre-regime 
features more intensive acceleration in the rate of return than the post-regime and the upper limit 
hits feature a relatively longer-lived and less intensive acceleration pattern than that of the lower 
limit hits. The last three minutes prior to the lower limit hits demonstrate the most dramatic price 
change compared with other intervals or with the upper limit hits.  
The differences in the acceleration rate between the two regimes are consistent with our 
intuition of the magnet effect. A narrower price limit during the pre-regime gives investors less 
room for continuous trading and implies a higher likelihood of crossing the price limit. The non-
execution cost imposed by the limit hit becomes more prominent and investors respond to the limit 
                                                 
16 Lindley (1957), Leamer (1978) and Connolly (1995) point out the problem related to large sample size in 
classical test statistics. Hence, the size-adjusted F-test critical value is [(T-k1)/P]*[T
P/T-1], where T is the 
sample size, k1 is the number of parameters estimated under the alternative hypothesis, and P is the number of 
restrictions being tested. The size-adjusted critical t-value is (T-k)
0.5*(T
1/T-1). We use the 1% level of 
significance as the rejection criterion and our results are robust to the adjustment. 
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more frenetically than during a wider price limit regime. Therefore, the acceleration rate in the pre-
regime is higher than that in the post-regime. 
 The differences between the upper and the lower limit hits can be explained by investors’ 
overly optimistic sentiments. If investors believe that an upward trend tends to persist, liquidity 
buyers will hurry to fulfill their liquidity needs in anticipation of a limit hit and speculators will bid 
up prices upfront with the expectation of realizing their profits at higher prices. However, when 
prices are going down, investors tend to believe it is transitory. Liquidity sellers will probably wait 
for the price reversal until the last chance of execution and speculators will defer locking in their 
losses as long as possible. As a result, investors jump onto an upward trend at an earlier stage 
leading to relatively mild acceleration in the rate of return and investors respond to a downward 
trend at a later stage but in a more concentrated fashion, especially during the last three minutes 
prior to the limit hits. 
B. Trading  Volume 
In the previous section, we observe high rates of return prior to the limit hits but it may not 
have any real impact on the cohort of investors if it is caused by some unusual but sporadic 
transactions and is not associated with heavy trading volume. Therefore, market liquidity is an 
important aspect when we examine the magnet effect, which will be presented in this section.
17 
Theoretical studies on the magnet effect have predicted heavier trading prior to the limit 
hits. Subrahmanyam (1994) suggests that investors may sub-optimally advance trades to assure 
their ability to trade. According to Gerety and Mulherin (1992), skittish investors overreact and 
leave the market in anticipation of the market close. Slezak (1994) also projects higher pre-closure 
trading volume in anticipation of a long period of non-execution. Lee et al. (1994) and Kim and 
Rhee (1997) document higher trading activities on the days subsequent to trading halts and limit 
hits but the lack of transaction data restricts their analyses to a daily basis. Little empirical evidence 
has been presented on intraday liquidity during the pre-hit period.  
                                                 
17 Additionally, we used the number of trades and the dollar amount of trades as liquidity measurements. The 
results are qualitatively similar.   
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The results on the trading volume are reported in Table III. Panel A summarizes the 
magnitude of trading volume during the ten three-minute intervals for the four groups. The 
transactions during the pre-hit period are significantly higher than those on non-limit-hit days. As 
prices approach the limit price, trading volume rises substantially. For example, the trading volume 
rises from 0.81 in interval 1 to 5.31 in interval 10 for the pre-up group and same pattern holds for 
other three groups. We also observe that the upper limit hits demonstrate uniformly higher trading 
volume than the lower limit hits in all intervals. For example, the average three minute trading 
volume for the pre-up group is 1.91, which is significantly higher than 1.23 of the pre-down group. 
Similarly, the average three minute trading volume is 1.96 for the post-up groups, compared with 
0.77 for the post-down group. The same relationship holds significantly throughout all ten intervals 
between the upper and the lower limit hits within the same regime. 
[Insert Table III] 
  Panel B reports the regression results of equation (2) on trading volume for the upper and 
the lower limit hits. There are significant acceleration patterns for all limit hit groups in that the 
coefficients of SQINT are positive and significant. It therefore supports the magnet effect and 
indicates that increasingly more transactions are drawn to the market as prices approach the price 
limit. Next we compare the acceleration rates between the two regimes. We observe that the 
coefficient of SQINT for the pre-regime is larger than that for the post-regime in both the upper and 
the lower limit hits regressions. It indicates that a narrower price limit causes more frenetic 
transactions in the proximity of price limits as a result of a higher likelihood of crossing the 
boundaries. The persistence measurement is 18.96 minutes, 18.02 minutes, 21.41 minutes, and 
18.59 minutes for the pre-up, the pre-down, the post-up and the post-down group, respectively. 
However, they are not significantly different from each other. 
In summary, a significant magnet effect is exhibited for all four groups in terms of trading 
volume. Investors respond to the price limit by realizing heavier transactions in anticipation of a 
price limit hit. The upper limit hits feature heavier transactions volume than the lower limit hits and 
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the breadth of the price limit rule has a significant impact on the acceleration rates. Besides the 
overly optimistic sentiment, the lack of short sale infrastructure in the KRX should also contribute 
to heavier transactions volume of the upper limit hits. Investors can usually materialize their 
positive expectations by placing more buy orders, but the high costs associated with short sales curb 
the realization of negative expectations.
18  As a result, investors are restricted from chasing a 
downward trend and fewer transactions take place prior to the lower limit hits. 
C. Volatility 
Volatility is a key attribute of the magnet effect because cooling off the market is stated as 
the primary purpose of a price limit. Earlier studies on volatility focus on the days after limit hits or 
trading halts and are also limited to a daily time frame. Lee et al. (1994) and Corwin and Lipson 
(2000) state that volatility increases significantly subsequent to trading halts. Kim and Rhee (1997) 
conclude that the price limit causes higher volatility levels on days subsequent to price limit hits 
and there is no significant difference in volatility between limit hit days and non-limit-hit days 
during the pre-hit days. Kim (2001) examines the relationship between price limits and market 
volatility using the Taiwan Stock Exchange data and finds that narrower price limits do not usually 
lead to lower volatility.  
Empirical evidence on intraday volatility has not been adequately documented, especially 
during the pre-hit period when the magnet effect is expected to occur. Cho et al. (2003) provides 
the only empirical evidence on intraday volatility using a GARCH model on five minute return 
series. They conclude that conditional volatility increases as prices move closer to the limits, which 
increases the probability of prices reaching the price limits. But the volatility was an insignificant 
portion of their paper and they did not show the growing pattern of the volatility. If the magnet 
                                                 
18 In the KRX, the proceeds from short sales are held by the securities companies as collateral in the margin 
account, which is again marked to market on a daily basis. Then the collateral has to be maintained up to a 
certain ratio of the extended credit to avoid the margin call. Moreover, securities companies raised the initial 
margin requirement and maintenance requirement after the Financial Supervisory Service relaxed relevant 
regulations to liberalize the market in March 1998. As a result, the short sales in 1998 and 1999 were at 
historically low levels. 
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effect does occur, we expect to observe higher price variability and rising volatility prior to the limit 
hits, as suggested by Gerety and Mulherin (1992) and Subrahmanyam (1994).  
Following Lee et al. (1994),  Corwin and Lipson (2000) and Christie et al. (2002), we use 
three intraday volatility measures, the absolute return (ABSRETURN), high-low price differences  
(HLOW) and the number of quote revisions within each three-minute interval (QUOTE 
REVISIONS). The three measurements capture different aspects of the volatility. The absolute 
return is a traditional measure of price variation. High-low price differences capture the dispersion 
of prices. The quote revisions are defined as the number of changes in either bid or ask prices, 
which can be perceived as an indicator of the investors’ eagerness to trade. If investors are nervous 
about the possibility of non-execution, they are likely to improve their positions frequently to assure 
execution. We expect to observe positive and rising abnormal volatility statistics prior to the limit 
hits if there is the magnet effect.  
The summary statistics of volatility and the regression results are listed in Table IV.  Panels 
A and B report the magnitude of volatility measurements for the pre-regime and the post-regime 
respectively. The volatility measures in the pre-hit period are positive and significant, except the 
quote revision during interval 1 of the post-down group. Significantly positive volatility 
measurements indicate that price variations during the pre-hit period is significantly higher than 
those on non-limit-hit days. Next, we compare the average volatility measurement between groups. 
We observe that the upper limit hits exhibit more frequent quote revisions than the lower limit hits, 
which is 1.11 and 0.53 for the pre-up and the pre-down group and 0.87 and 0.24 for the post-up and 
the post-down group. However, the lower limit hits exhibit higher ABSRETURN than the upper 
limit hits in the same regime. The comparison on HILOW is insignificant. Therefore, we conclude 
that the comparison on volatility magnitude is contingent on the choice of measurements.  
[Insert Table IV] 
In Panel C of Table IV, we report the regression results of equation (2) on the three 
volatility measures. The coefficients of SQINT are positive and significant for all group-
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measurements except for the post-down group on quote revisions. Positive coefficients of SQINT 
support the magnet effect in that volatility rises and accelerates when prices approach the limit 
prices. Next we make the comparisons between the two regimes. We conclude that the pre-regime 
has a significantly higher acceleration rate than the post-regime in all volatility measurements. For 
example, the acceleration rate of ABSRETURN is 0.069 for the pre-up group and it is 0.043 for the 
post-up group; the acceleration rate of HILOW for the pre-down group is 0.061, compared to 0.031 
for the post-down group; the acceleration rate of quote revisions for the pre-up group is 0.022 and it 
is 0.012 for the post-up group. The persistence measures are reported at the bottom of Panel C and 
they are not significantly different between groups. 
  We conclude, in summary, that a strong magnet effect is exhibited in the volatility behavior 
during the pre-hit period. There is significantly higher volatility during the pre-hit period than on 
non-limit-hit days. The pre-regime exhibits higher acceleration rates in all volatility measurements 
than the post-regime, consistent with our earlier findings on the rate of return and the trading 
volume. The comparisons on the magnitude of volatility are contingent on the measurements. 
Notably, the last three minutes prior to the lower limit hits feature a huge price variation than other 
intervals, which could be explained by investors’ tendency to jump onto the downward trend at the 
last minute. 
 D.  Order Flow  
In the earlier sections, we have shown that there exists a strong magnet effect in the rate of 
return, trading volume and volatility. In the following we take a closer look at the investors’ trading 
behavior by examining the limit order book. The limit order book, provided by the KRX records 
rich information on the order activities in a trading day, e.g. order type, order conditions, order 
price, order volume and time stamp. We examine order submissions, order imbalances and order 
revisions in this section and we will examine the choice of order type in the next section.  
The predictions on the trading volume can be safely applied to the order flow. If investors 
become nervous and sub-optimally submit orders to avoid non-execution, we expect to observe 
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abnormally high order submissions during the pre-hit period. In addition, we expect to observe buy 
order imbalances prior to the upper limit hits and sell order imbalances prior to the lower limit hits 
as a result of one directional market herding. We also investigate the revised buy and sell orders 
during the half hour prior to the limit hits. In the KRX, only limit orders can be later revised to 
better positions, which means that limit buy orders can only be revised to higher prices and/or 
higher volumes and limit sell orders can only be revised to lower prices and/or higher volumes. By 
examining revised orders, we are able to detect the means by which investors advance their orders.  
The results on the order flow information are reported in Table V. Panel A reports the share 
volume and the ratio of regular and revised buy/sell orders for the pre-up and the pre-down groups. 
In Panel B, we present the same statistics for the post-regime. The ratio of buy/sell orders for the 
upper/lower limit hits is the percentage of buy/sell orders out of the total amount of buy and sell 
orders during the same time period. The regular buy/sell order ratios measure the order imbalances 
prior to the limit hits. A higher regular buy order ratio indicates that there are more buy volumes in 
the market than the sell volumes.  
From Panel A and B of Table V, we observe that there are considerably more volumes of 
regular buy/sell orders and higher buy/sell order imbalances than on non-limit hit days throughout 
the ten intervals prior to the upper/lower limit hits. Investors place substantially more orders to 
chase the ongoing upward or downward trend, which causes large order imbalance on one side of 
the market. The results on the revised order volumes are not as robust as the regular orders but they 
become significantly positive during the last few intervals prior to the limit hits. Weak evidence on 
the revised orders aligns with our intuition because the most direct way to jump on a bandwagon is 
to place new orders, rather than revising the stale orders.  
[Insert Table V] 
Moreover, we observe that the upper limit hits feature significantly higher order flow than 
the lower limit hits, only with one exception of the regular buy order ratio between the post-up and 
the post-down groups. For example, the regular buy order volume is 1.17 for the pre-up group, 
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compared with 0.67 for the regular sell orders of the pre-down group. Similarly, the revised buy 
order volume for the post-up group is 0.33, higher than -0.01 for the revised sell orders for the post-
down group. The difference between the upper and the lower limit hits in order flow is in line with 
our conjecture of the short sale constraints. Investors are restricted from placing sell orders even in 
anticipation of a downward trending market.  
Panel C of Table V lists the regression results of equation (2) on the share volume of the 
regular and revised orders for the upper and the lower limit hits respectively. The coefficients of 
SQINT are significant and positive for all the limit-hit groups. Positive coefficients of SQINT 
imply that investors place increasingly more orders and make frequent revisions to their existing 
orders prior to the limit hits from the side of the market that actually leads to the limit hits. Next, we 
compare the acceleration rates between the two regimes. The pre-regime shows a higher 
acceleration rate in the regular orders. For example, the regular buy orders for the pre-up group 
accelerate at 0.038 and it is 0.025 for the post-up group. The acceleration rate of regular sell orders 
for the pre-down group is 0.038, significantly higher than 0.015 for the post-down group. However, 
there is no significant difference between the acceleration rates of revised orders between the two 
regimes. It could be explained that only incumbent investors can choose this option and a lot more 
investors choose to place new orders to get in the queue of the trend. 
Lastly, the persistence measure is 21.9 minutes for the regular orders and 20.9 minutes for 
the revised orders, averaged across the four limit-hit groups. The persistence comparisons between 
groups are not significant except that the pre-up group exhibits a significantly slower persistence 
than the pre-down group on the regular order submissions. 
In summary, we conclude that there is strong evidence of the magnet effect on the order 
flow from the side of the market that ultimately drives the limit hits. It indicates that investors 
respond to the imminence of the price limit by placing increasingly more orders and repositioning 
their stale orders to more competitive positions. More specifically, investors place more buy orders 
and repositioning their stale buy orders when an upper limit hit is imminent; likewise, investors 
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accelerate sell orders and reposition stale sell orders to jump onto the bandwagon before a lower 
limit hit is triggered. Additionally, we conclude that the breadth of the price limit has a significant 
impact on the acceleration rate of the order flow and the direction of the limit hits plays a 
significant role in the quantity of order submissions and revisions. A narrower price limit features a 
higher acceleration rate, and the upper limit hits draw heavier regular orders and revised orders than 
the lower limit hits. These results are consistent with our earlier findings.  
E. Order  Type 
Order type is another important vehicle with which investors have the discretion to advance 
their transactions. In the KRX, investors can place three types of orders: market orders, limit orders 
and limit-or-market-on-close-orders. Market and limit orders consist of more than 95% of the total 
orders; therefore we focus on the choice between limit and market orders. To the best of our 
knowledge, it will be the first evidence on order type choices in the literature of price limits. 
The choice between limit and market orders is contingent on the costs and benefits associated with 
the order type. Greenwald and Stein (1991) identify two drawbacks of limit orders. First, limit 
orders carry a risk of non-execution. Therefore limit orders are likely to be avoided by traders with 
a high demand for immediacy and also by those with valuable but perishable inside information. 
Second, limit orders are subject to the adverse selection problem. Limit orders leave traders 
exposed to innovations in fundamentals that could occur between the time an order is placed and 
the time it is executed. As a result, limit orders are relatively attractive when the variance of 
fundamentals is low. Bae et al. (2003) provide additional evidence of the impact of non-execution 
on the order type choice. They state that the proportion of limit orders monotonically decreases 
throughout the trading day because traders are less likely to submit limit orders when there is little 
time left until the market closes.  Verhoeven et al. (2004) report that order imbalance is major 
determinant of the traders’ decision to place market and limit orders.  A similar point is made by 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) in their study of circuit breakers on the two-day period of October 
27-28, 1997 on the NYSE. They note that the extreme uncertainty concerning the ability to trade 
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continuously causes market participants to alter their behavior in that sellers use more market 
orders and less limit orders during the nine minutes before the trading halt. 
  Price limits share similar characteristics with circuit breakers and the market closure in that 
it practically closes continuous trading and orders outside the price limit become invalid. The non-
execution cost becomes increasingly prominent as prices approach the limit price. And there is no 
reason to believe that adverse selection problem has improved during the half hour pre-hit period. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that investors will use more and more market orders as prices approach 
the limit to avoid the non-execution costs and possible deterioration in the adverse selection. We 
again focus on the side of the market that ultimately drives the limit hits, which is the buy side for 
the upper limit hits and the sell side for the lower limit hits.         
The results are listed in Table VI.
19  Panels A and B report the magnitude of market buy 
orders and the ratio of market buy orders out of the total buy orders prior to the upper limit hits and 
market sell orders and the ratio of market sell orders out of total sell orders prior to the lower limit 
hits. Investors use considerably more market orders prior to the limit hits than on non-limit-hit days, 
among both regular order submissions and executed orders. In particular, investors submit 
increasingly more regular market buy/sell orders prior to the limit hits in both the absolute and the 
proportion terms, throughout almost all pre-hit intervals. For example, regular market buy orders 
rise from 0.39 in interval 1 to 3.34 in interval 10 for the pre-up group; the regular market sell orders 
rise from 0.34 to 2.92 for the pre-down group. The results on the executed market orders are less 
robust for the lower limit hits but they become significantly positive towards the limit hits.  
[Insert Table VI] 
We again compare the magnitude of market orders between the upper and the lower limit 
hits in the same regime. We find that the upper limit hits show significantly heavier use of market 
orders than the lower limit hits except on the executed market order volume. For example, the 
average three minute regular buy market order volume is 1.17 for the pre-up group, compared with 
                                                 
19 We have also used the dollar amount of market orders and the frequency of market orders to conduct the 
same analysis. The results remain qualitatively similar. 
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0.89 for the pre-down group. It is 1.19 for the post-up group and significantly higher than 1.08 for 
the post-down group. 
In Panel C of Table VI, we report the regression results of equation (2) on the share volume 
of the regular and executed market orders. The coefficients of SQINT are positive and significant 
for all groups, showing that investors choose to use more and more market orders to advance their 
positions in the order queues and as a result, more market orders are executed than on non-limit-hit 
days. Next, we observe that the pre-regime features a higher acceleration rate on the regular market 
orders than the post-regime. To illustrate, the acceleration rate for regular market orders is 0.053 for 
the pre-up group and it is 0.044 for the post-up group. Regular market sell orders accelerate at 
0.050 for the pre-down group, relative to 0.034 of the post-down group. The differences in the 
acceleration rate of the executed market orders between two regimes are not significant. It can be 
understood that only the best priced and the timeliest placed orders are executed whereas investors 
can submit as many orders as they want to. Lastly, the persistence measures are 20.5 minutes for 
the regular market orders and 19.1 minutes for the executed market orders, averaged across the four 
groups. The persistence comparison between groups is insignificant. 
In summary, we conclude that there exists a strong magnet effect on the order type choice 
prior to the limit hits. In order to achieve timely execution, investors choose to use increasingly 
more market orders, i.e. more market buy orders before the upper limit hits and more market sell 
orders before the lower limit hits. As a result, more market orders are executed than on non-limit-
hit days. The choice of market orders reflects investors’ eagerness to fulfill the transaction and 
avoid the cost of non-execution imposed by the price limit. In addition, we find that the pre-regime 
is characterized by higher acceleration rates than the post-regime and the upper limit hits tend to 
cause more market orders than the lower limit hits, especially in terms of the regular market orders. 
We do not observe significant changes in the order type on the opposite side of the limit hits.   
IV.  Robustness Analysis 
A.  Analysis of Non-Limit-Hit Days 
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We have so far concluded that there is a significant magnet effect when the price limit 
becomes imminent in a market with the price limit rule. We now introduce a control group of 
stocks matched by the time of the day for the same firm to further verify that the magnet effect is 
directly caused by the proximity to the price limit.  While so doing, we extend the comparison to 
the half hour post-hit period to examine the behavior of the key variables. 
We select the same stock’s immediately preceding non-hit day for each limit hit as the 
control observation. Further, we choose the same time period corresponding to the half hour pre-hit 
period during the control day. In the end, the pre-up control group has 1399 observations, the post-
up control group has 1,173 observations, the pre-down control group has 287 observations and the 
post-down control group has 484 observations. The post-hit period is defined as the half hour 
period after the lifting of the price limit on the limit hit days and the corresponding time period on 
the non-limit-hit days. 
For each control group, we conduct the same analysis and compare it with the limit hit 
groups. Figures 2A, 2B and 2C highlight the differences between the pre-up group and its control 
group in terms of the trading volume, the quote revisions and the market buy order ratios.
20  From 
Figure 2, we observe that the standardized trading volume, volatility (as measured by the quote 
revisions), and the choice of market buy orders on non-limit-hit days are insignificant and there is 
no systematic pattern. Results on other market microstructure variables are qualitatively similar. 
Heavier transactions volume is observed during the post-hit period than on non-limit-hit days, but 
not as heavy as during the pre-hit period. High trading volume during the post-hit period may 
suggest that smart investors strategically pick on stocks that have hit the price limit, expecting a 
run-up in the following days, as stated in Seasholes and Wu (2004). We also find that high volatility 
lingers on for a short period after the limit hits within the same day, consistent with the volatility 
spillover compiled by Kim and Rhee (1997) using daily data from the Tokyo Stock Exchange.   
                                                 
20 To conserve space, we present the results on selected variables. The results on other market variables also 
support that there is no magnet effect in the control groups.  
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In summary, we find no magnet effect on the firm and the time-of-the-day matched control 
group and the post-hit period does not exhibit the magnet effect either. Some evidence is found to 
indicate that the price discovery process is hampered by the limit hits because volatility and 
transactions volume remain higher during the post-hit period than the non-limit-hit control groups. 
We conclude that the magnet effect is unique to the time period when the trigger of the price limit 
becomes imminent. Investors respond to the potential interruption of continuous trading by jumping 
onto the bandwagon and accelerating their trading activities.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
B.  The Magnet Effect vs. the Market Closure Effect 
It is quite possible that the price behavior we observe prior to the limit hits may be the same 
as the price behavior just before the entire market closes on any trading day.  If there is no 
difference between the two, then one may conclude that price limits represent premature market 
closures.  Naturally, it is important to distinguish between the magnet effect and the market closure 
effect.  We believe that the control group introduced in the previous section can be used to examine 
the difference between these two effects.   
We identified the stocks that hit the limits during the last fifteen minutes of a trading day 
and compare them with the non-limit-hit group constructed in the same way. We find a significant 
magnet effect for the limit hit group but not for the control group, thus confirming that the magnet 
effect is different from the market closure effect. 
C.  The Magnet Effect vs. the Momentum effect 
  In the earlier part of the paper, we document that investors respond to the common signal of 
the proximity to the price limit by placing increasingly more orders, choosing more market orders 
and repositioning existing orders to advance the transactions, supporting the magnet effect. 
However, one should be aware that the magnet effect is not the only reason for the accelerated 
trading; it could be the results of the intraday positive feedback trading as investors purchase stocks 
that have risen and sell stocks that have declined during the earlier period of the day, as 
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documented by De Long et al. (1990) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999). If investors herd based on the 
lagged returns, the rate of return and other key variables studied in this study may exhibit 
momentum even if there is no price limit rule. Unfortunately, the differentiation of the magnet 
effect from the momentum effect is not an easy exercise, if not impossible.   
In order to isolate the magnet effect from the momentum effect, we introduce a notion of 
“quasi limit hits.”  We impose a hypothetical 12% price limit to the post-regime limit hit days and 
identify the quasi limit hits if the stock price hits the hypothetical 12% price limit prior to the actual 
trigger of 15% price limit. We then compare the progressions of ∆DTL and trading volume between 
the quasi limit hits and actual limit hits using the same analysis as those introduced in the early part 
of the paper.
21  If no differences are observed between the two cases, the momentum effect is 
dominant for the both.  However, a higher level of trading volume, a greater fluctuation in prices, 
and a significantly stronger acceleration pattern observed for the actual limit hit cases than the quasi 
limit hit cases may be considered as indirect evidence that the magnet effect is not the same as the 
intraday momentum effect.   
Our quasi limit hit sample consists of 257 upper limit hits and 114 lower limit hits. Table 
VII summarizes the progressions of the change in the distance to limit (∆DTL) and the standardized 
trading volume (VOL) during the half hour prior to the quasi limit hits.  In Panel A, we report the 
average ∆DTL and VOL for each interval prior to the limit hits and the average across all intervals. 
We observe that ∆DTL and VOL are significant but are substantially smaller than the values for the 
corresponding pre-regime and post-regime limit hits. For example, the average three minute VOL 
for the quasi upper limit hits is 1.36, significantly smaller than 1.91 for the pre-up and 1.96 for the 
post-up groups. The differences in the magnitude are attributed to the magnet effect because both 
the pre-regime and the post-regime limit hits are bounded by the price limit rule, but which is not 
the fact for the quasi limit hits.  
                                                 
21 To conserve space, we only report the results of ∆DTL and VOL in this section. All other key market 
variables exhibit similar results.  
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Furthermore, we examine the acceleration of ∆DTL and VOL for the quasi limit hit groups, 
reported in Panel B of Table VII. We document that both the upper and lower quasi limit hits 
exhibit a significant acceleration pattern as a result of positive feedback trading but the magnitude 
of the acceleration rate is significantly smaller than the actual limit hits. To illustrate, the 
acceleration rate of ∆DTL for the quasi upper limit hit group is 0.021 in contrast to 0.038 observed 
for the post-up group.
22 The acceleration rate of VOL is 0.041 for the quasi upper limit hit group 
compared with 0.076 for the post-up group.
23 F-tests at the bottom of Panel B, Table VII report the 
comparison between the quasi limit hits and the actual limit hits in terms of the acceleration rate 
and they are all significant at 1% level. The persistence comparisons between the quasi limit hits 
and the actual limit hits are not significant. 
[Insert Table VII] 
The significant differences in the magnitude and the acceleration rates estimated for ∆DTL 
and VOL between the quasi and the actual limit hits should be attributed to the magnet effect.  As 
prices approach the limit price, investors react to the signal of reaching the price limit by jumping 
onto the bandwagon and accelerate their transactions to avoid non-execution costs. 
D.  A Market without Price Limits  
  We have attributed the difference between the quasi limit hits and the actual limit hits to the 
existence of the magnet effect based on the robustness test in the previous section.  This is possible 
because the quasi and actual limit hits are introduced in the market where the price limit system is 
in place. Another interesting experiment is to conduct a similar test in a market without the price 
limit rule. In such a market without daily price limits, we may identify two groups of stocks which 
experience price changes of 12% and 15%, respectively and investigate the progression of key 
variables introduced in this study.  In the absence of the price limit system, we should expect no 
                                                 
22 The comparable figure for the actual upper limit hit group in the pre-regime period is 0.062 which is 
significantly greater than those of the quasi and actual limit hit groups in the post-regime period.   
 
23 The acceleration rate for the actual upper limit hit group in the pre-regime period is 0.102 which is again 
significantly greater than those of the quasi and actual limit hit groups in the post-regime period.   
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significant differences between the two groups each with 12% and 15% price changes because no 
magnet effect should exist and all we may observe is the intraday momentum effect generated by 
the feedback trading behavior.   
We select the NASDAQ market for our experiment because it has more similarities with 
the KRX-listed stocks in terms of firm size, price level, and investor profiles than the NYSE. We 
choose the common stocks that traded on each of the trading day in our study period with the 
average number of daily transactions greater than 100 and with the average price greater than $5. 
Our NASDAQ sample amounts to 587 stocks whose intraday transaction data are retrieved from the 
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. The filters in Bessembinder (2003) are adopted to eliminate the 
errors in the transaction data. In the absence of price limit rule in the NASDAQ market, we 
introduce the concept of “pseudo limit hits.”  To be consistent with our analyses of the KRX-listed 
stocks, we impose hypothetical 12% (between ±11.5% and ±12.5%) and 15% (between ±14.5% and 
±15.5%) daily price limits to identify the pseudo upper and lower limit hits from September 1 to 
December 31, 1998. As a result, we identify 540 upper limit hits and 367 lower limit hits under the 
12% price limit rule and 276 upper limit hits and 143 lower limit hits under the 15% price limit rule.  
We are well aware that it is impossible to make cross-country comparisons due to the 
fundamental differences between the KRX and the NASDAQ.  In lieu of cross-country 
comparisons, we rather examine and compare two pseudo limit hit cases in the same NASDAQ 
market to confirm that there are no differences between the two cases.  This intra-market 
comparison within NASDAQ allows us to avoid the problem of comparing two markets of very 
different market microstructure.  In the absence of daily price limits, two pseudo limit hit cases 
should share a common momentum effect and they should not be different from one to another, 
unlike the quasi and the actual limit hit cases in the KRX market. Hence, no difference between two 
pseudo limit hit cases on the NASDAQ market should be indirect indication that price discovery on 
the NASDAQ is not dictated by the magnet effect. Specifically, we expect to observe heavier 
transactions and an acceleration pattern prior to the pseudo limit hits as the result of intraday 
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positive feedback trading. However, there should not be any difference between the 12% pseudo 
limit hits and 15% pseudo limit hits in the absence of the magnet effect. Table VIII reports the 
regression results of the pseudo limit hit groups.  
[Insert Table VIII] 
We observe that the coefficients for the SQINT are significant for all regressions but the F-
test at the bottom of Table VIII shows that the differences between two hypothetical regimes are 
uniformly insignificant for both ∆DTL and VOL. The insignificant differences between the 12% 
and the 15% regimes in the NASDAQ are in contrast with our earlier findings in the KRX in two 
aspects. First, we document that the pre-regime limit hits have a stronger acceleration pattern than 
the post-regime limit hits as a result of a narrower price limit rule. Second, we observe a significant 
difference in the acceleration rates between the quasi limit hits and the actual limit hits in both 
regimes because the latter incurs the magnet effect while it is absent for the former group.  
Moreover, we compare the average ∆DTL and VOL between the hypothetical 12% and 
15% regimes for the half hour period prior to the limit this and fail to find any significant 
differences between regimes or between the upper and the lower limit hits. Consequently, we 
attribute the lack of the differences between the two regimes in the NASDAQ to the absence of the 
magnet effect and conclude that the magnet effect is unique to a market with the price limit rule. 
V.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we use the transaction files and the limit order book of the Korea Stock 
Exchange to examine the existence and the dynamics of the magnet effect. We provide the first 
comprehensive analysis of the magnet effect from five market variables (rates of return, trading 
volume, volatility, order flow and order type) and three dimensions (magnitude, acceleration and 
persistence). We conclude that there exists a strong magnet effect in all variables during on average 
twenty minutes prior to the limit hits. It is observed that investors alter their trading behavior when 
the price limit becomes imminent to assure order executions. More specifically, investors place 
increasingly more buy orders when prices approach upper limit prices and increasingly more sell 
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orders when prices approach lower limit prices. In addition, investors choose proportionally more 
market buy orders and constantly bid up stale buy orders when an upper limit hit is imminent. 
Conversely, investors choose more market sell orders and bid down stale sell orders in face of a 
potential lower limit hit. As a result, prices approach the limit prices at a progressively rising speed. 
  In addition, the fact that our dataset covers two price limit regimes enables us to make the 
comparisons between two regimes and isolate the momentum effect from the magnet effect. We 
compare the same direction limit hits between the 12% and the 15% price limit regimes and 
document that the breadth of the price limit has a significant impact on the acceleration rate of the 
magnet effect. The pre-regime features higher acceleration rates in almost all market variables. A 
narrower price limit implies a higher likelihood to cross the boundaries, holding all other factors 
constant, and the tension of non-execution will be built up more quickly and more strongly than in a 
wider price limit regime. Therefore, investors respond to the proximity of price limit more 
frantically than in a wider price limit regime.  
  Moreover, a sufficient number of observations for both the upper and the lower limit hits 
make it possible to examine the magnet effect under different market conditions. We conclude that 
the direction of the limit hits has a significant impact on the magnitude of the magnet effect. The 
upper limit hits feature heavier trading volume, more order submissions, more frequent quote 
revisions and proportionally more market orders than the lower limit hits during the pre-hit period. 
Investor psychology and the limited availability of short sales in the KRX may partially explain the 
differences between the upper and the lower limit hits. Lastly, we observe that the magnet effect 
sustains on average twenty minutes. The upper limit hits exhibit longer persistence than the lower 
limit hits but they are not statistically different from each other for most of the variables.  
The magnet effect is further confirmed by the robustness tests. We do not find a magnet 
effect in the firm and the time-of-the-day matched groups. Our results of the magnet effect in the 
KRX are still robust after taking into account of the intraday momentum effect. We construct quasi 
limit hits by imposing 12% price limit to the post-regime and conclude that there are significant 
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differences between the quasi and the actual limit hits. The differences between the quasi and the 
actual limit hits in terms of the acceleration rate and the magnitude support our hypothesis that 
there is a magnet effect irrespective of the momentum effect and the proximity to the price limit 
alters investors’ trading behavior to assure execution. Moreover, we document that there is no 
magnet effect in a market without the price limit rule, e.g. the NASDAQ. The lack of differences 
between the pseudo 12% limit hits and the 15% limit hits in the NASDAQ reinforces our claim that 
the magnet effect is driven by the price limit rule and is therefore unique to a market with the price 
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Figure 1 
Intraday Distribution of Price Limit Hits 
 
Figure I plots the distribution of price limit hits during each half hour period in the trading day. Our 
sample of price limit hits is categorized into four groups: pre-up, post-up, pre-down and post-down groups 
based on the direction of limit hits and the price limit regime. The morning trading session in the pre-regime 
is 9:30AM - 11:30AM and it is 9:00AM - 12:00Noon in the post- regime. The afternoon trading session is 
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Figure 2 
Non-Limit Hit Comparison 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the differences between the pre-up group and its matched group. To conserve 
space, we only present the differences in trading volume, quote revisions and the ratio of market buy orders 
out of the trading volume. The control group consists of the days that are the closest previous non-limit-hit 
days relative to each limit hit day. We measure the market variables during the half hour pre-hit period and 
the half hour post-hit period for both the limit hit group and its control group. Interval 1 to interval 10 
represents the ten three minute intervals prior to the first moment of limit hits. Interval 12 to interval 21 
represents the ten three minute intervals after the lifting of the price limits. Interval 11 represent the time 
period from the first moment of the limit hit to the moment that the price limit is lifted. All the values are 
standardized by the mean and stated in terms of the standard deviation on the non-limit-hit days.  
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(C) Market Buy Order Ratio 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics of Limit Hits 
 
Our sample includes all the limit hits from September 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999, excluding the days 
that both upper and lower limit hits occurred. Daily price limit was raised from 12% to 15% on December 7, 
1998, which divides our study period into two regimes, the pre-regime, September 1-December 6, 1998 and 
the post-regime, December 8, 1998-March 31, 1999. Our sample is further classified into four groups based 
on the direction of the limit hits and the regime. They are: the pre-up, the pre-down, the post-up, the post-
down groups, with the prefix signifying the regime and the suffix representing the direction of limit hits. 
Panel A presents the following eight variables: (i) total number of limit hits; (ii) average number of 
limit hits per trading day; (iii) number of limit hits that occurred in the morning trading session; (iv) number 
of limit hits that occurred in the afternoon trading session; (v) number of limit hits that occurred at the market 
open; (vi) number of limit hits that closed at the limit prices; (vii) number of price continuations; and (viii) 
number of price reversals. If the stock closes at the upper/lower limit price on the limit-hit day and the 
following first non-limit-hit day opens at a higher/lower price, we define it as a price continuation. Likewise, 
if the stock closes at the upper/lower limit price on the limit-hit day and the following first non-limit-hit day 
opens at a lower/higher price, we define it as a price reversal. The values in the parentheses of item (3), (4), (5) 
and (6) are the ratios of this item to item (1). The values in the parentheses of (7) and (8) are the ratios of each 
item to item (6). 
Panel B presents the mean, the median and the maximum values of the following three variables: 1) 
intraday multiple limit hits, which is the number of intraday limit hits on limit-hit days; 2) limit hit duration, 
which is the time lapse from the moment of the first limit hit to the last moment that prices stay at limit prices 
in a limit-hit day; 3) number of limit hits by an individual stock, which is the number of limit hits by an 
individual stock. Medians are reported in the parentheses and the maximums are reported in the brackets. 
 
Panel A: 
  PRE-UP POST-UP  PRE-DOWN  POST-DOWN   
(1)  Total Number of Limit Hits  1449  1219  300  492 
(2)  Average Daily Limit Hit  18.1  16.5  3.8  6.6 
(3)     Morning Limit  Hits  870  (60%)  744  (61%)  140  (47%)  234  (48%) 
(4)             Afternoon Limit Hits  579  (40%)  475  (39%)  160  (53%)  258  (52%) 
(5)  Limit Hits at Market Open  244  (17%)  148  (12%)  42  (14%)  91  (18%) 
(6)  Close at Limit Prices  975  (67%)  794  (65%)  139  (46%)  267  (54%) 
(7)            Price Continuation 776  (80%)  610  (77%)  73  (53%)  177  (66%) 
(8)            Price Reversal    118  (12%)  115  (14%)  46  (33%)  73  (27%) 
 
Panel B:  
   PRE-UP  POST-UP  PRE-DOWN  POST-DOWN 
5.4 8.4  5.1  5.2 
(4) (5)  (2)  (3)  Intraday Limit Hits 
[94] [288]  [90] [75] 
82 62  50  93 
(57) (30  (11)  (32)  Limit Hit Duration (Minutes) 
[242] [300]  [240]  [302] 
5.2 4.1  2.4  2.3 
(4) (3)  (2)  (2) 
Limit Hits by Individual Stocks  
 
[21] [14]  [7] [11] 
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Table II 
Rate of Return Progression 
 
Table II reports the return progression during the half hour pre-hit period. The thirty minutes pre-
hit period is measured backward from the first moment of limit hits on a limit hit day. It is further divided 
into ten three minute intervals, denoted by Interval 1 - Interval 10 from the furthest to the closest distance 
to the moment of limit hits. Distance to the limit, DTL, is the percentage distance at a given price to the 
upper price boundary on the upper limit hit days and to the lower price boundary on the lower limit hit days. 
∆DTLk,t,,i, the change in DTL for stock k on day t at interval i measures the rate of return. ∆DTL is 
standardized by the mean on non-limit-hit days, stated in terms of the standard deviation. 
Panel A reports the standardized ∆DTL for each interval prior to the limit hits and the average 
three-minute ∆DTL across all intervals. Panel B reports the regression results of equation (2) in the main 
text for the upper and lower limit hits respectively, where the dependent variable is ∆DTL. INT takes the 
value of 1 to 10. SQINT is the squared INT. For the regression on upper/lower limit hits, Dummy1 takes the 
value of unity if the observation belongs to the pre-up/pre-down group and 0 if it belongs to the post-
up/post-down group; vice versa for Dummy2. F-test reports the comparison of the coefficients of SQINT 
between two regimes. P value is bracketed. The values in the parentheses are the standard errors. All values 
are significant at 1% level. Persistence at the bottom of Panel B is equal to 3*(10+β/2γ) in number of 
minutes for the pre-up, post-up, pre-down and post-down groups respectively. ** and * next to the 
persistence measure indicate that the upper limit hits persistence is slower than that for the lower limit hits 
in the same regime at 1% and 5% level respectively.  
 
Panel A: Magnitude of ∆DTL 
INTERVAL PRE-UP  PRE-DOWN POST-UP  POST-DOWN 
1 0.33  0.42 0.25  0.31 
2 0.30  0.15 0.30  0.13 
3 0.33  0.36 0.37  0.34 
4 0.50  0.14 0.45  0.38 
5 0.36  0.53 0.46  0.60 
6 0.51  0.33 0.69  0.58 
7 0.75  0.37 0.78  0.80 
8 1.11  0.78 0.98  0.99 
9 1.61  1.03 1.31  1.11 
10 3.20  4.03 2.51  3.30 
AVERAGE 0.90  0.81  0.81  0.85 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
  UPPER LIMIT HITS  LOWER LIMIT HITS 
DUMMY1 0.935 (0.063)  1.349    (0.158) 
DUMMY2 0.599  (0.063)  0.794    (0.116) 
DUMMY1*INT -0.439  (0.026) -0.704    (0.066) 
DUMMY2*INT -0.23  (0.026)  -0.375   (0.049) 
DUMMY1* SQINT  0.062 (0.002)  0.087   (0.006) 
DUMMY2* SQINT  0.038  (0.002)  0.055    (0.004) 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARE  0.347   0.313    
F-TEST 50.93 [<0.0001]  18.85   [<0.0001] 
PERSISTENCE (Minutes) 
















    
 
Table III 
Trading Volume Progression 
 
Table III reports the progression of trading volume during the half hour pre-hit period. The thirty 
minute pre-hit period is measured backward from the first moment of the limit hits within a limit hit day, 
which is further divided into ten three minute intervals, denoted by Interval 1 - Interval 10 from the furthest 
to the closest distance to the moment of limit hits. Raw trading volume is measured in each three minute 
interval and standardized by the mean share volume on the non-limit-hit days, stated in terms of the 
standard deviation. 
Panel A reports the average trading volume for each interval prior to the limit hits and the average 
three minute trading volume across all intervals. ** next to the Average indicates that the average three 
minute trading volume for the upper limit hits are significantly higher than those of the lower limit hits in 
the same regime at 1% level. Panel B reports the regression results of equation (2) in the main text, where 
the dependent variable is trading volume. INT takes the value of 1 to 10. SQINT is the squared INT. For 
the regression on upper/lower limit hits, Dummy1 takes the value of unity if the observation belongs to the 
pre-up/pre-down group and 0 if it belongs to the post-up/post-down group; vice versa for Dummy2. All 
values are significant at 1% level. F-test reports the coefficient comparison of SQINT between two regimes. 
P value is bracketed. The values in the parentheses are the standard errors. The last row of Panel B reports 
the persistence measure for the pre-up, post-up, pre-down and post-down groups respectively.  
 
Panel A: Magnitude of Trading Volume 
 
INTERVAL PRE-UP PRE-DOWN  POST-UP POST-DOWN 
1  0.81 0.28  0.88  0.20 
2 0.95  0.35  0.95 0.17 
3 0.90  0.52  0.97 0.29 
4 0.97  0.84  1.07 0.26 
5 1.06  0.30  1.33 0.26 
6 1.24  0.44  1.36 0.39 
7 1.47  0.62  1.72 0.55 
8 1.88  1.01  2.02 0.71 
9 2.68  1.47  3.43 0.81 
10 5.31 4.28  4.09  2.71 
AVERAGE  1.91 **  1.23  1.96 **  0.77 
Panel B: Regression Results 
 
  UPPER LIMIT HITS  LOWER LIMIT HITS 
DUMMY1 1.954 (0.237)  1.523      (0.291) 
DUMMY2 1.569 (0.245)  0.852    (0.222) 
DUMMY1*INT -0.751 (0.095)  -0.767    (0.117) 
DUMMY2*INT -0.486 (0.100)  -0.441      (0.090) 
DUMMY1* SQINT  0.102 (0.008)  0.096     (0.010) 
DUMMY2* SQINT  0.076 (0.009)  0.058     (0.008) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE  0.128   0.151     
F-TEST 4.58 [0.032]  9.16    [0.003] 





(Pre-Down)    18.59 
(Post-Down) 





This table reports the progression of volatility during the half hour pre-hit period. Three volatility 
measured as applied. ABSRETURN is the absolute rate of return from the last transaction price of the 
previous interval to the last transaction price of the current three minute interval. HLOW is the difference 
between the high and the low prices during each interval. Quote revisions are the number of bid or ask 
price changes during each interval. All the measurements are standardized by the mean on non-limit-hit 
days, stated in terms of the standard deviation. 
Panel A and B report the three volatility measurements for the pre-regime and the post-regime 
respectively. The average volatility for each interval and across all intervals are reported in Panel A and B. 
** next to the Average indicates that the average three minute volatility measurement during the pre-hit 
period for this group is significantly higher than those for the comparison group in the same regime at 1% 
level. Panel C reports the regression results of equation (2) in the main text. For the regression on the 
upper/lower limit hits, Dummy1 takes the value of unity if the observation belongs to the pre-up/pre-down 
group and 0 if it belongs to the post-up/post-down group; vice versa for Dummy2. F-test reports the 
coefficient comparison for SQINT between two regimes. P value is bracketed. The values in the 
parentheses are standard errors. All other values are significant at 1% level unless crossed. + indicates that 
the value is not significant. ++ indicates that the value is significant at 5% level. The last row of Panel C 
reports the persistence measure, 3*(10+β/2γ), for the four limit-hit groups, stated in the number of minutes. 
 
Panel A: Magnitude for Pre-Regime 
 
 PRE-UP  PRE-DOWN 
INTERVAL ABSRETURN  HILOW  QUOTE 
REVISIONS  ABSRETURN HILOW  QUOTE 
REVISIONS 
1 0.46  0.51  0.62 0.42  0.57  0.26 
2 0.41  0.48  0.64 0.37  0.51  0.21 
3 0.42  0.52  0.76 0.58  0.55  0.32 
4 0.43  0.58  0.82 0.60  0.60  0.44 
5 0.43  0.51  0.93 0.68  0.38  0.50 
6 0.44  0.58  0.98 0.50  0.57  0.45 
7 0.53  0.73  1.15 0.38  0.44  0.53 
8 0.81  0.89  1.37 0.64  0.75  0.59 
9 1.30  1.37  1.67 1.13  1.08  0.71 
10 3.21  2.07 2.18  6.14  2.70 1.28 




















Panel B: Magnitude for Post-Regime 
 
 POST-UP  POST-DOWN 
INTERVAL ABSRETURN  HILOW  QUOTE 
REVISIONS  ABSRETURN HILOW  QUOTE 
REVISIONS 
1 0.09  0.53  0.48 0.34  0.56  0.07 
+ 
2 0.23  0.54  0.51 0.39  0.60  0.11 
++ 
3 0.28  0.52  0.59 0.55  0.74  0.13 
++ 
4 0.33  0.54  0.66 0.43  0.73  0.24 
5 0.38  0.66  0.73 0.69  0.85  0.22 
6 0.44  0.72  0.86 0.96  0.93  0.25 
7 0.61  0.77  0.96 0.93  1.14  0.24 
8 0.72  0.93  1.08 1.02  1.07  0.34 
9 0.98  1.23  1.31 1.15  1.19  0.36 
10 2.56  1.67 1.59 5.26  2.47 0.43 
AVERAGE  0.66  0.85  0.87 **  1.17 **  1.10 **  0.24 
Panel C: Regression Results 
 
 
UPPER LIMIT HITS  LOWER LIMIT HITS 
 
ABSRETURN HILOW  QUOTE 
REVISIONS ABSRETURN HILOW  QUOTE 
REVISIONS
DUMMY1  1.260  0.894 0.746  2.145  1.327 0.339 
  (0.066)  (0.054) (0.049)  (0.228)  (0.160) (0.092) 
DUMMY2  0.595  0.716 0.504  1.448  0.877 0.049 
+ 
 
  (0.068)  (0.055) (0.054)  (0.175)  (0.122) (0.072) 
DUMMY1*INT  -0.560  -0.276 -0.086  -1.105  -0.518 -0.056 
+ 
  (0.027)  (0.022) (0.021)  (0.094)  (0.064) (0.038) 
DUMMY2*INT  -0.291  -0.143 -0.016
+ 
-0.711  -0.188 0.030 
+ 
  (0.028)  (0.023) (0.022)  (0.073)  (0.050) (0.030) 
DUMMY1* SQINT  0.069  0.038 0.022  0.132  0.061 0.013 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.006) (0.003) 
DUMMY2* SQINT  0.043  0.023 0.012  0.095  0.031 0.001 
+ 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.004) (0.003) 
ADJUSTED R-
SQUARE  0.262 0.334  0.322  0.277  0.309  0.087 












Pre 17.83  19.11  24.14  17.44  17.26  23.54  PERSISTENCE 
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Table V 
Order Flow Progression 
 
Table V reports the progression of order flow during the half hour pre-hit period. We focus on the 
side of the market that leads to the limit hits, buy side for the upper limit hits and sell side for the lower 
limit hits. Panel A reports the volume and the ratio of regular and revised buy/sell orders for the pre-up/pre-
down group. The average order flow in each interval and across all intervals is reported. Panel B presents 
similar statistics, only for the post-regime. ** next to the Average indicate that the average three minute 
order flow measurement during the pre-hit period for this group is significantly higher than those for the 
comparison group in the same regime at 1% level. 
 Panel C reports the regression results of equation (2) in the main text on the share volume of 
regular and revised buy/sell orders for the upper/lower limit hits. INT takes the value of 1 to 10. SQINT is 
the interval squared. For the regression on the upper/lower limit hits, Dummy1 takes the value of unity if the 
observation belongs to the pre-up/pre-down group and 0 if it belongs to the post-up/post-down group; vice 
versa for Dummy2. F-test reports the coefficient comparison for SQINT between two regimes. P value is 
bracketed. Values in the parentheses are standard errors. All values are significant at 1% level unless 
crossed. + indicates that the value is not significant. ++ indicates that the value is significant at 5% level. 
The bottom of Panel C reports the persistence for each limit-hit group. ** next to the persistence indicates 
that this persistence measure is slower than that for the comparison group in the same regime at 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Magnitude for Pre-Regime 
 
 
  PRE-UP  PRE-DOWN 
 
  REGULAR BUY  REVISED BUY  REGULAR SELL  REVISED SELL 
INTERVAL  VOLUME RATIO VOLUME RATIO VOLUME RATIO VOLUME  RATIO
1 0.49  0.39  -0.01 
+ 0.25  0.24 0.17 -0.28  0.20   
++
2 0.52  0.31  -0.06 
+ 0.24  0.23  0.23  -0.30  0.13 
+ 
3 0.56  0.33  -0.03 
+ 0.25  0.29  0.18  -0.20  0.34 
4 0.74  0.36  0.08 
+ 0.34  0.34  0.17 -0.12 
+ 0.26 
5 0.77  0.40  0.05 
+ 0.36  0.52  0.33 -0.17  0.20 
6  0.98 0.47 0.09 0.39 0.40 0.27 -0.20  0.20 
7  1.21 0.54 0.27 0.51 0.53 0.33  -0.09 
+ 0.47 
8  1.57 0.62 0.55 0.66 0.80 0.50  0.13 
+ 0.49 
9  2.05 0.70 0.86 0.77 1.10 0.62 0.29  0.50 
10 2.76 0.72 1.29 0.91 2.28 0.84 0.80  0.59 
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Panel B: Magnitude for Post-Regime 
 
 
  POST-UP POST-DOWN 
  REGULAR BUY  REVISED BUY  REGULAR SELL  REVISED SELL 
INTERVAL VOLUME  RATIO  VOLUME  RATIO  VOLUME RATIO  VOLUME  RATIO
1  0.39 0.25  -0.03 
+ 0.31 0.31  0.26  -0.35  0.27 
2 0.50  0.30  -0.04 
+ 0.38 0.31  0.34  -0.32  0.28 
3 0.58  0.36  -0.03 
+ 0.43 0.32  0.35  -0.19  0.33 
4 0.63  0.37  0.02 
+ 0.41 0.36  0.35  -0.18  0.34 
5 0.77  0.44  0.12 
+ 0.46 0.44  0.51  -0.07 
+ 0.51 
++ 
6 0.92  0.47  0.18 
+ 0.55 0.59  0.53  -0.09 
+ 0.42 
7 1.06  0.49  0.36 0.64 0.59  0.53  -0.13  0.44 
8 1.33  0.59  0.49 0.76 0.72  0.57  0.06 
+ 0.51 
9 1.68  0.58  0.70 0.85 0.73  0.68  0.19  0.61 
10 2.24 0.57 1.15  1.05 1.33  0.70 0.46  0.68 
AVERAGE  1.01 **  0.45  0.33 **  0.59**  0.57  0.48  -0.01  0.45 
Panel C: Regression Results 
 
 
UPPER LIMIT HITS  LOWER LIMIT HITS 
  REGULAR BUY  REVISED BUY  REGULAR SELL  REVISED SELL 
  VOLUME VOLUME  VOLUME  VOLUME 
DUMMY1 0.887  0.776  0.838  0.550 
 (0.061)  (0.074)  (0.129)  (0.150) 
DUMMY2 0.695  0.671  0.593  0.480 
 (0.066)  (0.080)    (0.097)  (0.118) 
DUMMY1*INT -0.195  -0.194  -0.269  -0.173 
 (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.053)  (0.059) 
DUMMY2*INT -0.095  -0.130  -0.083   
++ -0.087 
+ 
 (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.047) 
DUMMY1* SQINT  0.038  0.030  0.038  0.025 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
DUMMY2* SQINT  0.025  0.025  0.015  0.015 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE  0.383  0.298  0.217  0.205 
F-TEST  15.26 [<0.0001]  1.86 [0.17]  21.27 [<0.0001]  2.23 [0.14] 
Pre 22.30  **  20.30  19.38  19.62  PERSISTENCE 
(Minutes)  Post 24.30  22.20  21.70  21.30 
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Table VI 
Order Type Progression 
 
This table reports the progression of order compositions during the half hour pre-hit period. We 
focus on the market order from the side of the market that leads to the limit hits. Panel A reports the share 
volume and the ratio of regular and executed market buy/sell orders for the pre-up/pre-down groups. Panel 
B reports the same statistics, only for the post-regime. The three minute average for each interval and 
across all ten intervals are reported in Panel A and B.  ** next to the Average indicate that the three minute 
average during the pre-hit period for this group is significantly higher than those for the comparison group 
in the same regime at 1% level. 
Panel C reports the regression results of equation (2) in the main text on the share volume of 
market orders. INT takes the value of 1 to 10. SQINT is the INT squared. For the regression on the 
upper/lower limit hits, Dummy1 takes the value of unity if the observation belongs to the pre-up/pre-down 
group and 0 if it belongs to the post-up/post-down group; vice versa for Dummy2. The values in the 
parentheses are the standard errors. F-test reports the coefficient comparison for SQINT between two 
regimes. P value is bracketed. All other values are significant at 1% level unless crossed. + indicates that 
the value is not significant. ++ indicates that the value is significant at 5% level. Persistence is reported at 
the bottom of Panel C. 
 
Panel A: Magnitude for Pre-Regime 
 
   PRE-UP   PRE-DOWN 
 
 
REGULAR MKT BUY 
 
EXECUTED MKT BUY 
 
REGULAR MKT SELL 
 
EXECUTED MKT SELL 
INTERVAL  VOLUME  RATIO  VOLUME R ATIO  VOLUME  RATIO VOLUME  R ATIO 




2 0.60  0.38  0.30  0.15  0.45  0.26  0.49 
++  0.28 
3 0.55  0.28  0.13 
+  0.19  0.58 0.28 0.49  0.12 
+ 
4  0.69 0.41  0.22  0.22  0.46 0.24 0.93 0.25   
++ 
5 0.67  0.35  0.37  0.20  0.58  0.36  0.09 
+ 0.16 
+ 
6 1.00  0.54  0.38  0.35  0.53  0.25  0.54 
+ 0.06 
+ 
7 1.01  0.57  0.31  0.36  0.71  0.35  0.33*  0.12   
++ 
8  1.39 0.72  0.48  0.47  1.00 0.49 0.55  0.45 
9  1.91 0.96  0.69  0.82  1.25 0.62 0.65  0.35 
10  3.34 1.77  1.32  1.87  2.92 1.78 1.30  1.43 























Panel B: Magnitude for Post-Regime 
 
   POST-UP POST-DOWN   
 
 
REGULAR MKT BUY 
 
EXECUTED MKT BUY 
 
REGULAR MKT SELL 
 
EXECUTED MKT SELL 
INTERVAL VOLUME RATIO  VOLUME RATIO  VOLUME  RATIO VOLUME  RATIO
1 0.54  0.31  0.37  0.30  0.57  0.19  0.31   
++ 0.34 
2 0.48  0.26  0.39  0.24  0.68  0.32  0.23   
++ 0.39 
3 0.64  0.36  0.35  0.36  0.71  0.36  0.14 
+ 0.30 
4  0.76  0.41  0.43 0.40  0.74  0.32 0.48 0.33 
5  0.82  0.47  0.43 0.36  0.78  0.42 0.33 0.37 
6 1.02  0.51  0.51  0.52  1.02  0.48  0.72  0.5 
7  1.15  0.61  0.60 0.56  1.11  0.59 0.77 0.69 
8  1.45  0.75  0.71 0.83  1.22  0.66 0.66 0.62 
9  1.81  0.85  1.00 1.06  1.28  0.68 0.88 0.64 
10  3.12  1.58  1.45 2.16  2.65  1.41 1.67 1.66 
AVERAGE  1.19  **  0.62**  0.79  0.70** 1.08  0.53 0.84 0.59 
 
Panel C: Regression Results 
 
 










DUMMY1 1.003  0.628  1.070  0.731 
 (0.081)  (0.106)  (0.176)  (0.263) 
DUMMY2 0.951  0.627  1.037  0.475 
 (0.087)  (0.095)  (0.133)  (0.158) 
DUMMY1*INT -0.331  -0.248  -0.365  -0.209* 
 (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.100) 
DUMMY2*INT -0.249  -0.178  -0.205  -0.156 
 (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.055)  (0.061) 
DUMMY1* SQINT  0.053  0.031  0.050  0.026 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
DUMMY2* SQINT  0.044  0.025  0.034  0.026 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE  0.289  0.304  0.247  0.318 
F-TEST  3.81 [0.05]  1.61 [0.21]  6.63 [0.01]  0.01 [0.93] 
Pre 20.63  18.00  19.05  17.94  PERSISTENCE 
(Minutes) 












Quasi Limit Hits 
 
This table presents the progression of ∆DTL, the change in the distance to the limit and the 
standardized trading volume (VOL) during the half hour prior to the quasi limit hits under the post-regime. 
We define the quasi limit hits as the cases that prices trigger hypothetically imposed 12% price limit rule 
before actually triggering the limit hits during the post regime. The sample includes 257 quasi upper limit 
hits and 114 quasi lower limit hits.  
Panel A reports the average ∆DTL and VOL for each interval and across all intervals during the 
half hour pre-hit period. Panel B reports the regression results of equation (2) in the main text on ∆DTL and 
VOL for the quasi upper and lower limit hit groups. The values in the parentheses are the standard errors. 
The bottom two rows in Panel B highlight the coefficients of SQINT for the actual limit hit groups and the 
F-test reports the comparisons of the coefficients of SQINT between the quasi limit hit groups and the 
actual limit hit groups. F values are bracketed. All the values and comparisons are significant at 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Magnitude 
 
  QUASI UPPER LIMIT HITS  QUASI LOWER LIMIT HITS 
INTERVAL  ∆DTL  VOL  ∆DTL  VOL 
1 0.16  0.80  0.27  0.28 
2 0.17  0.95  0.31  0.19 
3 0.13  0.88  0.00  0.11 
4 0.14  0.97  0.66  0.49 
5 0.14  1.07  0.42  0.30 
6 0.21  1.15  0.54  0.33 
7 0.31  1.34  0.85  0.48 
8 0.34  1.52  0.74  0.55 
9 0.55  1.94  1.12  0.60 
10 1.03  3.01  2.26  1.01 
AVERAGE 0.32  1.36  0.72  0.43 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
  QUASI UPPER LIMIT HITS  QUASI LOWER LIMIT HITS 
  ∆DTL  VOL  ∆DTL  VOL 
INTERCEPT 0.371  1.214  0.546  0.32 
 (0.065)  (0.10)  (0.233)  (0.134) 
INT -0.155  -0.259  -0.21  -0.067 
 (0.027)  (0.040)  (0.095)  (0.055) 
SQINT 0.021  0.041  0.035  0.013 
 (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE  0.052  0.113  0.100  0.040 
F-TEST        
Pre-Regime Limit Hits  0.062 [132.90]  0.102 [77.55]  0.087 [24.11]  0.096 [23.39] 








A Market without the Price Limit: NASDAQ 
 
This table reports the regression results on ∆DTL and VOL for the pseudo limit hits in the 
NASDAQ when the 12% and the 15% price limit rules are hypothetically imposed. Our sample consists of 
540 upper limit hits and 367 lower limit hits under the 12% price limit rule and 276 upper limit hits and 143 
lower limit hits under the 15% price limit rule. All the variables are defined the same as in the Korea Stock 
Exchange. Dummy1 takes the value of unity if the observation is from the 12% price limit rule and 0 
otherwise. Dummy2 takes the value of unity if the observation is from the 15% price limit rule and 0 
otherwise. The values in the parentheses are the standard errors. The comparison of the coefficients of 
SQINT between the 12% and 15% price limit regimes are reported at the bottom as the F-test. The p-value 
of the F-test is bracketed. All the coefficients are significant at 1% level unless marked. + indicates it is not 




  UPPER 12% vs. UPPER 15%  LOWER 12% vs. LOWER 15% 
  ∆DTL  VOL  ∆DTL  VOL 
 
DUMMY1  3.440 6.409  4.385 3.491 
 (0.428)  (1.640)  (0.520)  (0.769) 
DUMMY2 4.457  4.293
 +  6.120 4.847 
 (0.600)  (2.294)  (0.835)  (1.231) 
DUMMY1*INT -1.809  -1.450 
++  -2.176 -0.786   
++ 
 (0.178)  (0.685)  (0.216)  (0.321) 
DUMMY2*INT -2.101  -0.585 
+ -2.701  -1.301   
++ 
 (0.249)  (0.958)  (0.347)  (0.514) 
DUMMY1* SQINT  0.235  0.159  0.262  0.109 
 (0.016)  (0.061)  (0.019)  (0.028) 
DUMMY2* SQINT  0.263  0.106 
+ 0.312  0.154 
 (0.022)  (0.085)  (0.031)  (0.046) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE  0.183  0.023  0.185  0.080 
F- TEST  1.050 
+ [0.31]  0.250 
+ [0.62]  1.890 
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